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THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON
THE COST PERFORMANCE AND
GROWTH STRATEGIES OF THE
LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES
GEORGE EADS*
In this article Professor Eads concludes that the performance
of the local service carriers has fallen far short of the goals estab-
lished by the Civil Aeronautics Board when this carrier group was
established in the 1940s. He traces the blame for much of this
failure to faulty government regulation. He observes that the
quality and quantity of airline service provided to the smaller
communities that depend solely on the local service carriers for
their certificated air service has deteriorated over the last ten years
while the cost to the federal government of providing this service
has increased.
Professor Eads feels that the government has four options:
(1) end the local service subsidy altogether; (2) pay the local
service carriers subsidy sufficient to compensate them for the serv-
ices they provide to smaller communities using whatever aircraft
they choose and accept the much higher subsidy bill that inevitably
will result; (3) encourage local service carriers to subcontract cer-
tain of their routes to air taxis; or (4) permit the CAB to try a new
scheme of subsidization involving competitive bidding for the right
to provide stated quantities of service. Professor Eads prefers the
fourth option believing it will result in superior service at substan-
tially lower cost, but he points out pitfalls that may prevent such
a scheme from working in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
N A DECISION dated July 11, 1944, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, announced that it was initiating an "experiment" to ex-
pand air service to the smaller, more isolated communities of the
* B.A., University of Colorado; M.A., Ph.D., Yale University. The author is
currently serving as Special Economics Assistant to the Assistant Attorney Gen-
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
country notwithstanding ". . . the traffic potential at small cities is
not encouraging.' The CAB proposed to accomplish this expan-
sion by creating a new group of "feeder" or "local service" carriers
specializing in short-haul, low-density air service rather than
through the use of the sixteen certificated air carriers then in
existence. The first of these carriers was Essair (later called Pioneer
Airlines), which began operations on August 1, 1945, flying a
single round trip per day over a route linking Houston and
Amarillo, Texas with intermediate stops at Austin, San Angelo,
Abilene and Lubbock. Essair used the nine-passenger Lockheed
L-10 Electra, an aircraft designed specifically for short-haul, low-
density feeder-type operations. By the end of 1945 Essair had
carried 4,452 fare paying passengers over this route. By 1970 the
nine local service carriers served 453 cities and carried twenty-
seven million passengers using aircraft having an average seating
capacity of seventy. The smallest aircraft in general use among
them by the end of 1970 was the forty-passenger turboprop-
powered Fairchild F-27. Concerning this quarter century of growth,
it has been remarked:
Any way you cut the picture for analysis you come up with the
final conclusion that the experiment to expand scheduled air trans-
port services into the smaller communities of the nation 25 years
ago has been a monumental success-a classic case of enlightened
federal policy in partnership with typical.., businessmen operating
under the most productive free enterprise system in the world
The thesis of this article is that the primary "success" of the
era], Antitrust Division while on leave from Princeton University where he is an
Assistant Professor of Economics.
This paper was written prior to his assumption at his current position and in
no way should be construed as representing the official views of the United States
Department of Justice.
As this article was going to press the CAB announced that it would seek per-
mission from Congress to undertake an experiment of the type outlined in Pro-
fessor Eads' option four. To support its position, it released a three-volume study
titled Service to Small Communities conducted by the staff of its Bureau of Op-
erating Rights. This study, performed completely independently of Professor Eads'
work and not made available outside the Board prior to its official release, iden-
tifies the same problems with the current method of subsidy payments as Pro-
fessor Eads does in this article and reaches many of the same conclusions as to
what could be done to improve the subsidy program.
1 Investigation of Local Feeder and Pick-up Air Service, 6 CAB 2 (1944).
' Editorial, Needed: Jet Age Decisions, FLIGHT MAO. 21 (June, 1969).
LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES
"local service experiment" has not been provision of efficient short-
haul, low-density air service, but rather the creation of nine weak
trunkline carriers. This "success" has cost the taxpayer approxi-
mately one billion dollars in direct cash subsidy payments; addi-
tional trunklines, if that is a worthwhile goal, could have been
accomplished at little or no cost to the taxpayer merely by relaxing
the CAB's long standing prohibition on direct entry into the trunk-
lines ranks-a prohibition that has not allowed an entry since the
Board was created in 1938. Thus, this article will argue that the
service provided to smaller, more isolated communities has been
more costly and of lower quality than was necessary and that this
is in large measure the result of the regulatory policies of the
CAB. Moreover, this analysis leads to the proposal that subsidy to
the local service carriers be phased out over a short period and
that the local carriers be allowed to drop service to any points they
desire. In the relatively few cases in which federal subsidy for local
air service could be justified because of the geographic isolation of
some small communities, service could be provided either by air
taxis under subcontract with local service carriers that directly
contract with the federal government to perform specified services
in return for lump-sum subsidies. Adoption of these proposals
should substantially reduce the total amount of local service subsidy
while improving the quality of air service to smaller communities.
It would end the CAB's economically inefficient (and as yet un-
workable) policy aimed at internalizing the local service subsidy
by using profits generated on longer-haul routes to cover losses in-
curred on shorter lower-density routes. This would also eliminate
one of the major reasons for continued control over entry into the
airline industry and would remove some of the pressure that is
building for regulation of the now unregulated scheduled air taxis.
II. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE "LOCAL SERVICE EXPERIMENT"
When the CAB decided, in 1944, to undertake a significant
expansion of the nation's air transport network it faced a choice
of deciding how to accomplish this expansion. At that time sixteen
air carriers were already certified under the "grandfather" provi-
sions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.' There were also on
a 72 Stat. 754, as amended 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. 1371 (1964).
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file several hundred applications for certification of new "feeder"
air carriers, which would engage primarily in the provision of short-
haul, low-density air service. The Board's examiners cited five
factors favoring the use of existing rather than new carriers to
provide the new services:
1. The additional overhead expense involved in extending the
routes of existing carriers would be less than the overhead expenses
incurred by a separate enterprise;
2. The existing carriers, at least in some instances, would be able
to operate a local route which might be unprofitable in itself by
absorbing such losses with profit from long-haul services. In this
respect it was pointed out that the revenue from a passenger pick-
up at a "local" point and continuing beyond a terminal of local
route would be available for the entire journey to the existing
carrier, whereas only that part for the local transportation would
be available to a local operator;
3. Greater utilization of equipment would be possible;
4. The experience of existing carriers would be available for the
air transportation needs of the small cities; and
5. The quality of service in general would be higher if existing air
carriers provide it. In this connection specific reference was usually
made to the larger and more comfortable equipment that would be
used, and the fact that day and night, all-weather service would
be provided, as contrasted with the proposals of some new carriers
to use smaller equipment and, at least at the outset, to limit oper-
ations to a contact basis.4
Despite the apparent advantages of using existing carriers, the
examiners recommended (and the Board concurred in the recom-
mendation) the creation of a new class of specialist "feeder"
carriers. While examining the air service potential at smaller com-
munities, the examiners investigated the extent of patronage at
small cities already certified to receive air service. In September,
1940, eighty-eight cities of less than 50,000 population had been
served. The eighteen of these cities below 10,000 population
averaged only 4.0 arriving and departing passengers per day; the
thirty-one cities in the 10,000-20,000 population range averaged
5.7 passengers per day, and the thirty-nine cities with population
between 20,000 and 50,000 averaged 13.4 "in and out" passengers
" Service on a "contact basis" was a mail pick-up service using a hook attached
to the aircraft so that an actual landing was not required. 6 CAB at 29-30.
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per day.' The need for a high level of government subsidy seemed
obvious if patronage was to be so low to make service to these
cities viable unless the carriers providing "feeder" services man-
aged to achieve substantial operating cost savings. The Board be-
lieved that the best chance for obtaining savings was in the use of
new carriers. It concluded:
Most of the presently operating air carirers also urge as a reason
for putting small cities on existing routes the fact that the service
will be provided with the type of equipment used on long-haul
routes.... While some of the existing carriers indicated an inten-
tion to utilize different types of flying equipment, presumably
smaller in size for some services, progress towards the fullest
expansion [of air service] will be quicker if more emphasis is
placed on adding a large number of small cities and developing
equipment suitable for rendering service, rather than placing em-
phasis on the addition of points that can be given service with
large equipment.... The various proposals described in that part
of this report relating to the proposals of new carriers . . . have
the common characteristic of emphasizing economy and less lux-
urious standards of service. This characteristic must be constantly
emphasized, and the more progress that is made in this direction
the more prospects for air service will be created. Any substantial
economy of operation will have to result from departures from the
existing type of service. It is reasonable to assume that necessarily
different standards of operation can best be developed by new
carriers, organized for such a purpose.'
In the subsequent cases in which feeder routes were established,
the Board maintained this policy irrespective of contentions by
trunk carriers that they too could achieve cost savings in the oper-
ation of feeder-type services.'
III. METHODS AND EFFECTS OF SUBSIDY PAYMENT
The CAB created a separate group of feeder air carriers hoping
to minimize the cost of feeder services. However, the Board's sub-
sidies and regulations insured that the feeder services would not
5 d. at 13-14.
6 Id. at 52-53.
" In the Florida Case, 6 CAB 765 (1946), for example, National Airlines pro-
posed to affect such reductions by eliminating all ground station personnel at cer-
tain points and having the co-pilot sell tickets and load luggage. The Board re-
fused to be swayed by National's proposal and instead awarded the Florida feeder
routes to Florida Airways, a new "feeder" carrier.
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have minimum costs. When deciding upon the method that subsidy
should be paid to the feeder carriers, the Board was faced with a
dilemma. Wildly fluctuating financial results during the initial
months of operation provided no basis for judging subsidy need.
Yet the Board believed that to base the performance of the feeder
carriers using trunkline experience as a yardstick, would lead to
misleading results. It therefore adopted an "open" subsidy rate.
Each carrier was allowed to draw only enough subsidy to cover
its operating costs and to pay interest on its debt. When the carrier
and the Board thought that enough experience had been accumu-
lated to reflect an accurate picture of operations, they were to
negotiate a "final" rate that would apply until either the Board or
the carrier decided to reopen the negotiations. At the time of
settlement, the Board was to scrutinize the costs incurred while the
carrier operated under the "open" rate and disallow those costs that
were the result of "honest, economic, and efficient management."
Also the Board would pay the carrier a seven per cent rate of
return on its investment for the time it had been operating under
the "open" rate.
Several unfortunate results arose from this method of subsidy
payment. First, the use of "open" subsidy rates resulted in a virtual
"cost-plus" method of subsidy payment, which the Board itself
admitted was unsatisfactory, stating ". . . a method of mail rate
determination patterned upon a 'cost-plus' system would tend to
destroy a carrier's incentive to maintain costs at a reasonable
level. . . ."' Theoretically the knowledge that the Board could later
scrutinize a carrier's books and disallow costs that it felt were in-
consistent with standards of "honest, economic, and efficient man-
agement" should have tended to offset any adverse incentives. In
practice, however, the Board's disallowal powers proved merely
annoying to the carriers but nothing they feared greatly. Once a
carrier undertook to expand its schedules or acquire a new fleet
of aircraft, it incurred the costs associated with that decision; for
the Board several years later to demand a refund of subsidy paid to
cover such costs would be for it to force the carrier into in-
8 Essair, Inc., Temporary Mail Rate, 6 CAB 687, 690 (1946).
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solvency.! This the Board was reluctant to do." Thus, while dis-
allowals affected the rate of return earned by a carrier and were
of concern to the carriers, the Board was powerless to impose cost
consciousness upon the local service carriers with any degree of
severity if it wished to keep them in business.
While the "cost-plus" feature of the subsidy system tended to
lower the cost consciousness of the local carriers, the mechanics
of the subsidy payment system introduced a bias in relative factor
choice into the carriers' equipment purchasing decisions. A local
service carrier on an "open" subsidy rate reported its net earnings
and rate of return on investment on the basis of subsidy actually
received from the government. However, this amount did not in-
clude provision for a rate of return; it was also subject to the ex
post adjustment process previously described. Although a carrier
could list subsidy it considered due it (including that portion rep-
resented by the seven per cent rate of return on investment guar-
anteed by the government) as an account receivable, at the same
time, it had to inform stockholders and other potential investors
of the fact that this figure was subject to substantial uncertainty
pending the outcome of negotiations between the carrier and the
CAB. As a result, investors, unwilling to bear this increased risk
without compensation, demanded higher interest rates from the
local service carriers and imposed conditions on their loans that
had the effect at raising the cost of borrowing." The carriers'
'See KIMBALL, For Locals, Inefficiency Can Pay Off, AM. AVIATON 54-58
(Aug. 1958).
11The only case where the Board took and held a firm position against the
acquisition of excessively large equipment occurred in the Pioneer Air Lines Mail
Rate Case, 17 CAB 508 (1953). Pioneer had acquired a fleet of Martin 202's
to replace its DC-3s primarily to attain equipment partly with the trunklines with
which it competed. It was acknowledged that the use of the aircraft would result
in a substantial increase in Pioneer's subsidy need, at least in the short run. The
Board refused to approve the necessary subsidy increase and Pioneer was forced
to dispose of its Martin 202's and reacquired its DC-3s. Soon thereafter Pioneer
merged with Continental, a trunkline competitor. The Board came under strong
industry and Congressional criticism for its actions in the Pioneer case and in
following cases approved subsidy increases resulting from the acquisition of
larger aircraft. See Henzey, Locals to Get Aid in Buying New Fleets, AM. AVIA-
TION 92-93 (Feb. 1956).
11 Vaughn has documented the difficulties that this method of subsidy pay-
ment caused for one local service carrier. R.H. Vaughn, A Financial Assessment
of the Class Mail Rate Subsidy Formula for the Local Service Airlines, 51-52,
June 1, 1963 (unpublished thesis in Rutgers University Library).
1972]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
choice of aircraft during the effective period of this subsidy system
illustrates the impact it had upon their operations. The first feeder
carrier, Essair, began its operations with an aircraft especially de-
signed for short-haul, feeder-type operations. Within one year,
however, Essair sold its Lockheed L-10 Electras and acquired 24-
passenger DC-3's. These aircraft were considerably more expensive
to operate than the Electras, but they were acquired in part because
Pioneer was having to deny service to passengers at certain times
of the day on certain routes" and in part because Pioneer's route
structure allowed it to compete with trunk carriers, which used
DC-3's. Pioneer applied to the CAB to sufficiently increase its
subsidy to allow it to operate its DC-3's. The Board, while de-
claring the DC-3 "inherently uneconomical for local air service,"
nevertheless approved the increase, citing estimates provided by
Pioneer of the planned cost savings achieved by the use of the
aircraft. The Board in effect ignored these proposed economies,
stating that "we believe that more can be accomplished by leaving
the details [of economies to be affected] to the ingenuity of the
operators."'1
Accordingly by 1949 the great majority of the local service fleet
consisted of DC-3's, as a result of the decision to subsidize oper-
ating costs of excessively-large equipment." The other amenities
familiar to trunk-line travelers accompanied the DC-3's. As one
dissenting Board member wrote in a 1951 renewal case:
[A]s of today, the original experiment is unrecognizable. Most of
the local carriers now in operation perform services identical to
those of the trunk lines. They operate DC-3 equipment, provide
stewardess service and all the 'trimmings'. The emphasis on econ-
omy in operations has been lost sight of. .... "
"No rational transportation company seeks to have capacity sufficient to
meet all peak levels of demand on all its routes, as this would require it to operate
with considerable excess capacity at most time. What provision to make for peak
demand depends upon a balancing of the revenue lost by failing to meet certain
levels of the peak against the costs incurred from operating the capacity necessary
to provide a given probability of being able to offer service to the peak customer.
Government subsidy tended to distort this calculation.
138 CAB 175, 192 (1948).
4During 1949 the local service revenue passenger load factor was 28.2%
based upon an average seating capacity of twenty years; i.e., average revenue
passenger load was 5.64.
'5 Trans-Texas Certificated Renewal Case, 12 CAB 606, 627 (1951).
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In the following years the local carriers and the CAB recognized
the need for a DC-3 replacement. Many designs were proposed by
foreign and domestic manufacturers and some were built and
marketed. Yet it was not until 1965 that an actual DC-3 replace-
ment was placed in service by a local service carrier and then only
in limited numbers."0 The managements of the local service carriers
blamed aircraft manufacturers for being unable to produce efficient
short-haul aircraft, but under the system of subsidization in effect
during the 1940's and 50's, there was no incentive for a carrier to
generate capital, at a substantial cost, merely to lower operating
costs and, in turn, its subsidy."
There was an incentive, however, for the local carriers to equip
themselves with aircraft that would be comparable in size, speed
and comfort with those of the trunklines. Accordingly their com-
petitive position was enhanced where competition was possible.
If the government stood willing to subsidize this type of equip-
ment purchase through increased subsidy, so much the better.
The aircraft acquired to replace the DC-3's were mostly used
piston aircraft of thirty-six to fifty seat capacity. It has been shown
that the price of a used commercial aircraft is approximately equal
to the present value of its future net earnings." That is if two air-
craft are of equal capacity and have roughly the same passenger
appeal, the one with the higher operating costs will sell for less on
the used aircraft market. Thus the local carriers, lacking capital
funds because of their low and unstable rate of return, and having
no incentive to economize on operating costs, viewed the larger
piston aircraft favorably because of its low initial price.'" They
had the option of purchasing turboprop aircraft of approximately
, The aircraft was the French-built Nord 262. This was a small turboprop
aircraft seating up to twenty-eight passengers. Ten of them were purchased by
Lake Central and used to replace its DC-3's. In 1968 Allegheny acquired Lake
Central and in 1969 phased its Nords out of service.
"That the aircraft manufacturers were not to blame was proved by their
response to the demand by the unsubsidized air taxi operators for efficient, short-
haul equipment. Once there was an indication that orders would be forthcoming,
many designs appeared within a very short time and without the Government
aid the local carriers had claimed was needed to finance propotype development.
"Sobotka & Schnabel, Linear Programming as a Device for Predicting Mar-
ket Value: The Price of Used Commercial Aircraft, J. Bus. 10, 30 (Jan. 1961).
"See generally Peach, Convairs for Mohawks, FLIGHT MAG., June 1955, at
33; Editorial, Transport Transition, FLIGHT MAG., June 1959, at 23, 40.
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the same capacity as the larger piston aircraft or of converting the
larger piston aircraft to turboprop power by refitting them with
turboprop engines. This would have substantially lowered operating
costs, but either new or converted turboprop aircraft cost substan-
tially more to purchase than a used piston aircraft of equivalent
capacity. Therefore since operating cost savings had less utility to
the carriers than capital cost savings which were of great value,
most carriers replaced their DC-3's with second-hand large piston
aircraft."
The CAB realized that the method of subsidy compensation
established in 1946 was unsatisfactory and induced inferior per-
formance by the local carriers." Yet it was not until March 1961
that a new method of subsidization, the class rate, was established
by the Board. The class rate embodied the assumption that the local
service carriers were essentially homogeneous and that a simple
relationship could be found between the need for subsidy and a
measure of carrier activity. Accordingly a set of subsidy rates
based upon this measure of activity was established. If a carrier
could lower its operating costs relative to the average, it could
keep the additional profits that resulted within the established
limits of the class rate's profit sharing provisions. As a result, the
Board's authority to scrutinize and disallow costs was discontinued.
Thus, rather than wait interminably under the class rate a carrier
could have advance knowledge, within rather narrow limits, of the
amount of subsidy it would receive.
The class rate eliminated many distortions to the incentives that
had resulted from the previous subsidy compensation system. For
the first time the class rate provided a significant incentive to
reduce operating costs. Equally important was the stability intro-
20 Those few carriers that did buy turboprops used them on their longer routes
where their higher speed provided enhanced passenger attracting ability. Most
of these turboprop aircraft were financed by the government guaranteed loans,
since the carrier were unable to raise the funds to purchase them at free market
rates lying within their ability to pay.
2 Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 34 CAB 416, 432-33 (1961).
22 Originally, revenue plane miles per station per day was the measure em-
ployed. This was later changed to weighted departures per station per day.
23 If the rate of return actually earned was greater than the "fair and reason-
able differentiated rate of return" but less than 15%, the carrier was to refund
50% of the excess. If it was greater than 15%, 75% of the excess was to
be refunded.
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duced into subsidy payments. This stability, in addition to the
higher allowed rates of return established by the Board at the same
time, ' substantially improved the financial position of the local
service carriers and thereby lowered the cost of obtaining capital
funds.'
The impact on aircraft selection was desirable. Since there was
a positive incentive to reduce operating costs and could more
easily raise funds, the local carriers began to show a renewed in-
terest in turboprop aircraft. At the end of 1960 the local carriers
operated only thirty-five turboprop aircraft compared with fifty-
nine large piston aircraft." In November 1963, Frontier placed the
first firm order for Convair 580 turboprop conversions. By the end
of 1968 all Convairs had been converted to turboprop power and
the locals were operating 244 turboprop aircraft." Even if the
A In 1960, the Board decided that the "fair and reasonable rate of return
for the local carriers was to be 5.5% on debt and 21.35% on equity applied to
the carriers' actual capital structure. This rate was not to fall below 9% on total
investment nor to exceed 12.75% on total investment. Previously the rate of re-
turn allowed had been 7% while on an "open rate" and an individually nego-
tiated rate, usually around 8%, while on a "final" or "closed" rate. In later years,
the particular rates of return allowed on the various elements of a carrier's cap-
ital instructure were altered to reflect what were perceived as changed in the car-
riers cost of capital.
'See R.H. Vaughn, supra note 10. Between 1961 and 1966 the local service
carriers averaged a 16.97% after tax rate of return on stockholder equity and a
9.94% rate of return on total investment (after tax but before interest payments).
Both figures reflect adjustment to include the effect of income tax credits. In
addition both of these rates were much more stable during this period than they
had been in previous periods.
2" We have estimated that the increased operating costs of a conventional Con-
vair over a Convair with Allison turboprop engines amounted to approximately
$175,000 per year. The cost of conversion was approximately $500,000 to
$600,000 per aircraft. This implies a period of 2.9 to 3.7 years (excluding
interest and rate of return on the additional capital employed). At one point,
the local carriers were operating 200 large piston aircraft.
Four of the thirty-five turboprops in the local service fleet in 1960 were
Napier Eland Convair conversions owned by Allegheny. This conversion proved
unsuccessful when problems with the engine prevented time between overhaul
from exceeding 600 hours. Allison Turboprops to be Installed on Four Frontier
Convairs, AVIATION WEEK Nov. 25, 1963, at 39.
27 The two year delay between the establishment of the class rate and the first
orders for conversion can be explained by three factors. First, it took some time
before the investment communities realized the impact of the class rate upon the
local service rate of return. Second, during the 1961-63 period a quirk in class
rate I made it profitable for carriers to acquire large aircraft. For a given amount
of money a carrier could acquire more large piston aircraft than turboprops.
This quirk was removed when class rate II was established in 1963. Between 1960
and the end of 1963 more than 120 large piston aircraft were acquired. Finally,
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class rate method of subsidy payment, combined with a higher
allowable rate of return, tended to correct the distorted value
placed by the local carriers on operating costs relative to capital
costs, 8 it nevertheless failed to create any significant incentive to
acquire smaller aircraft. The class rate I, in effect from 1961 to
1963, actually rewarded the operator of excessively large aircraft
with high subsidy. 9 In 1963 the subsidy rates were adjusted to
neutralize the choice between the DC-3 and larger aircraft." When
it established class rate III in 1964, the Board refused to accept
Lake Central's request to establish a subsidy rate that would have
made Nord 262 operations more attractive." Only in 1967, when
the class rate IV was adopted, did the Board begin providing any
financial incentive for the local service carriers to use smaller air-
craft." Even this attempt was partially offset by a provision that
when aircraft of different capacities were used to serve a subsidy-
eligible route, subsidy payments were to be computed on the basis
of the capacity of the largest aircraft employed.
The continuing need of the local carriers for a DC-3 replace-
ment was highlighted by a study performed in 1964 for the FAA
by the Systems Analysis and Research Corporation." SARC pro-
jected local service traffic growth through 1975 and simulated
operations at these traffic levels to determine the aircraft size which
during the late 1950's and early 1960's the Board was very busy handing out
new routes to local carriers. Acquisition of the aircraft necessary to operate these
routes for which Central Airlines was applying, for example, would cost 5.1 mil-
lion dollars if DC-3's and F-27's were acquired. At the time Central's total assets
were $2.4 million, of which $85,000 represented account receivable-primarily
subsidy due but not yet collected. See Central Loses Bid for Recess in South-
western Case, Av. DAILY, Nov. 4, 1960, at 20. Once the improved financial con-
dition of the locals became apparent, the distortion in class rate I was removed
and the route awards were digested by the CAB. Turboprop acquisition and con-
version then rapidly proceeded.
8 Arguably, the correction tended to be too great and a bias of the opposite
sort was introduced. See Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regu-
latory Constraint, Av. EcoN. REV., Dec. 1962, at 1052.
"'Local Service Class Subsidy Rate, 39 CAB 65 (1963).
'0 Id. at 77.
"Investigation of the Local-Service Class Subsidy Rate, 41 CAB 138, 145
(1964).
" Cf. Board Shifts Policy on Subsidies, AVIATION WEEK, April 10, 1967, at
36, 37.
" See generally SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT HAuL TRANSPORT (1964).
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maximized profits or minimized losses on the low density routes.
The report concluded that even in 1975 more use should be made
of smaller (less than 40-seat) aircraft than was then (1963) being
made of the DC-3. Moreover, there would be a need for between
300 and 500 twenty-seat aircraft depending upon airline speed,
utilization and load factor targets."
Despite the findings of the SARC report, the phaseout of the
DC-3 continued. In 1960, DC-3's flew two-thirds of all local
service revenue miles. By 1963, DC-3 aircraft miles had dropped
to thirty-six per cent of the total. And in 1969 the aircraft was
completely eliminated from the local service fleets. In the same
year the Nord 262, the only DC-3 replacement ever purchased by
the local service carriers, was also retired. Moreover during 1969,
sixty-one per cent of the local service seat-miles were flown by
jets. Regarding the growth of local service carrier jet operations,
it was remarked:
For years the [local service] industry sought a DC-3 replacement.
All sorts of proposals were made and analyzed. Arguments flew
hot and heavy as to the proper specifications for the airplane to fit
the peculiar short-haul routes of the locals: but no universal re-
placement airplane was ever developed. That is, until the DC-9
series came along.'
The smallest DC-9 has a seating capacity of sixty-nine passengers,
while the DC-9-30, the jet aircraft in largest use by the local
carriers, can seat one hundred passengers.
In 1954, when the local service fleet consisted almost entirely of
DC-3's and averaged 22.4 seats per aircraft, there were 197 cities
served that generated fewer than 7,300 passengers per year (20 per
day). In 1969, with forty-five per cent of the local service aircraft
miles being flown by jets and the average number of seats per
aircraft at 64.9, almost three times the 1954 level, there were still
165 cities served by the local carriers that generated fewer than
7,300 passengers per year. Consequently the consistent failure of
Board subsidy policy to create meaningful economic incentives for
local carriers to use smaller aircraft, and the Board's continued
' The Beech 99, a 15-seat aircraft purchased in large numbers by the air taxis
is said to have been designed according to the specifications developed by the
FAA on the basis of the SARC Study.
I FLIGHT MAG., June 1969, at 21.
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support of the use of larger aircraft, constitute perhaps the most
important reasons for the failure of the "local service experiment."
IV. THE EFFECTS OF ROUTE POLICIES
The evolution of the CAB's route policy further explains the
growth pattern of the local carriers. Frequently, when the local
carriers were established, their routes would originate or terminate
at points already served by trunk lines, although the locals would
also be serving intermediate points. For example, in the West
Coast Case, feeder service was established between Los Angeles
and San Francisco. Trunkline service already existed between these
two terminals and at two intermediate points-Monterey and Santa
Barbara. The Board authorized Southwest Airways to serve these
cities and six other intermediate stops--Oxnard/Ventura, Santa
Maria, San Luis Obispo, Coalinga, Santa Cruz and San Jose.
The Board recognized that the feeder carriers would be tempted
to neglect the new stations, which were not expected to generate
traffic, and concentrate on winning a share of the trunkline traffic
between the larger cities." To prevent this and to insure that the
new carriers concentrated upon serving the markets they had been
created to serve, the CAB required that feeder carriers stop at all
intermediate points on their routes on every flight regardless of the
traffic generated by the intermediate points. The examiners, al-
though recognizing the need to restrict feeder operations if the
smaller communities were to be served, nevertheless argued against
the Board's restriction because it "would place a serious handicap
on the operator in cultivating the business of the traveler who
wants to get from a small town to a large town with a minimum
of delay."3 The examiners had proposed several alternative restric-
tions preserving feeder flexibility yet preventing the feeders from
competing with the trunks and abandoning their smaller stations,
but the Board ignored their recommendations.
Subsequently, the Board recognized that its restriction prevented
"6 The Los Angeles-San Francisco market, for example, was the nation's sec-
ond largest in terms of passengers and sixth largest in terms of passengers as of
September 1947. See F. Gill and G. Bates, AIRLINE COMPETITION 349 (1949
Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Uni-
versity).
3 Investigation of Local Feeder and Pick-up Air Service, 6 CAB 1, 55 (1944).
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the feeder carriers from achieving full traffic potential; but when
it chose to make modifications, it acted in a way to encourage
direct trunk-feeder competition rather than to encourage adequate
small town service. In 1946 the CAB granted Pioneer the right to
offer unrestricted shuttle service between any two points named
consecutively in its certificate. At that time, Pioneer's route in-
cluded several segments in which it could directly compete with
the trunklines. These points, however, were listed as intermediate
rather than terminal points in Pioneer's certificate. This meant that
any flight which Pioneer might operate between the competitive
points had to originate at a designated terminal point and continue
to another point. However, the Board's action freed Pioneer to
offer an unlimited number of flights on the competitive segments.
The Board's schizophrenic attitude toward direct trunkline-local
carrier competition is best shown in the series of cases reviewing
the local carriers initial three year operating certificates. The first
case to be settled involved Florida Airways which flew eight-
passenger Beech-18 aircraft and offered two round trips per day
to nine cities in Florida. Florida provided exclusive service to six
of these cities, and in March 1948, one year after Florida began
operations, the nine cities generated 577 arriving or departing
passengers, which was sixty-three per cent of Florida's monthly
traffic." During this month Florida received 28,871 dollars in
mail pay or 50.05 dollars for every passenger hauled either to or
from an exclusively-served city. During 1948 Florida received
more than seven dollars in mail pay for every dollar collected from
a passenger or shipper of air freight.' The Board decided on
March 9, 1949, not to renew Florida's certificate, because of this
high ratio of mail pay to commercial revenues and stating:
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that route No. 75 [Florida's
route] is an uneconomical route, that no substantial increase in
nonmail revenues can be expected in the reasonably foreseeable
future and that further expenditure of public funds will not avail
"See generally CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AIRLINE TRAFFIC SURVEY (March
1948).
"Subsidy was not reported separately from mail pay on carriers' accounts
until 1954. Most revenue reported as "mail pay" during the pre-1954 period was
subsidy.
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to develop it into a route that can be operated at a reasonable cost
to the Government commensurate with the service rendered."0
The polar extreme is illustrated by a recertification case involving
Pioneer Airlines. In 1948 mail pay had constituted more than
eighty-five per cent of Florida's total revenues. During 1949, the
year prior to the Pioneer recertification decision, almost half of
Pioneer's revenue came from non-mail sources. The Board re-
newed Pioneer's certificate for four additional years stating:
.. . the record indicates a substantial and increasing acceptance
of Pioneer's service. Moreover Pioneer's ratio of mail pay to com-
merical revenues is the most favorable of any existing local carrier.
While the total cost to the Government for Pioneer's service re-
mains considerable, the record conclusively shows that this carrier
is making encouraging progress toward commercial self-suffi-
ciency."'
Thus the Board clearly established in these two cases that a carrier's
ratio of mail pay to commercial revenues would form the primary
basis of the decision for recertification. This criterion continued to
be applied in subsequent renewal proceedings.
A further examination of Pioneer's operating results demon-
strates that such a standard was completely inappropriate for
judging whether to continue the "local service experiment." For
example, despite the Board restrictions limiting local service, trunk-
line competition, Pioneer was able to compete with the trunklines.
In the Pioneer Renewal Case the Board noted this fact. The March
1948 statistics revealed that Pioneer carried 6,251 passengers
during the month, almost seven times as many as Florida. Yet
only 1,012 of these passengers, or sixteen per cent, traveled either
to or from an exclusively-served city. And during March 1948,
Pioneer received 100,255 dollars in mail pay, or 99.07 dollars for
every passenger generated by a point served exclusively by Pioneer,
twice the level required by Florida during the same month.' As
argued by one Board member dissenting in a later case, ' the cri-
4Florida Airways, Inc., Certificate Extension, 10 CAB 93, 97 (1949).
4 Pioneer Certificate Reviewal Case, 12 CAB 1, 5 (1950).
'During March 1949 Pioneer's mail pay per passenger travelling to or from
an exclusively served community was $113.61. See generally CIVIL AERONAUrICS
BoARD, Am TRAFFIC SURVEY (March 1948).
1 Trans-Texas Certified Reviewal Case, 12 CAB 606, 637 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
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terion of the cost to the government of providing service to persons
who otherwise would be denied air service should have been con-
trolling rather than the ratio of mail pay to nonmail pay in deciding
whether recertification was in the public interest. Judged on these
grounds, Pioneer, basically a trunkline carrier serving a few small
cities, was less deserving of recertification than was Florida, a
carrier attempting, within the Board's severe restrictions, to offer
the type of service envisioned by the Board when it decided to
initiate the "local service experiment" in 1944. Perhaps neither
carrier deserved recertification and the better course for the Board
was to have terminated the "local service experiment." This course
was not followed, however; and no feeder carrier operating DC-3's
and offering service comparable to the trunklines was denied recer-
tification. No carrier not operating DC-3's was recertified.
The Board began relaxing its restrictions on direct local service-
trunkline competition as early as 1946 and continued loosening
the restrictions through the 1960's. Prior to 1966, however, except
in rare cases, the CAB prohibited a local carrier from offering
non-stop service over a segment also served by a trunk carrier, but
in that year this last prohibition was abandoned.
A second method of "route strengthening" undertaken by the
Board was the transfer of points from trunklines to local carriers
and the suspension of trunks where joint service was offered.
Initially the trunks opposed these suspensions, primarily in the
courts, challenging the Board's legal right to make them." Over
time however, the advantages of abandoning smaller cities ap-
peared more attractive to the trunks. The Board was even accused
of soliciting a list of points the trunks would like to drop.' Between
1949 and 1964, seventy-eight cities were transferred from trunks
to locals, trunks were suspended at fifty-one points where joint
service had been offered and at twenty-four additional stations
trunks were suspended and replaced by locals though joint trunk-
local service remained.
The one form of "route strengthening" on which the Board
procrastinated was the elimination of marginal stations. During
the late 1950's and early 1960's in a series of new area cases many
" See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 196 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1952);
United Airlines v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952).
"Editorial, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 14, 1960, at 262.
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new marginal points were added, contributing greatly to the sub-
sidy increase occurring during that period. For example, in the first
of these cases, ' sixteen points were added to Frontier's routes. By
1965, ten of these sixteen points were dropped for failing to
generate an average of five passengers per day, the minimum
standard for continuing service. In 1965 the remaining six stations
generated a total of 28,024 passengers for Frontier, of which
13,991, almost one-half, came from Rapid City, South Dakota.
The other five stations generated an average of 7.8 passengers per
day, barely above the minimum standard. Thus of the sixteen
points added, only one was a success. Although the minimum
standard was established in this case, the Board applied it slowly
and the standard itself was unrealistically low. Even as late as
1969, thirty-four stations receiving a full year's service failed to
meet this minimum. The reason for this slow response was prob-
ably because both the Board and the local carriers realized the
necessity of retaining smaller cities if they were to keep the Con-
gressional support on which subsidies depended. The local carriers
therefore continued to serve the marginal cities although they
reduced service frequencies and used aircraft that were larger and
more costly to operate than would have been used if their interest
had been to efficiently serve these cities. The carriers received sub-
sidies to cover their operating costs and used the high, stable rates
of return received after 1961 to establish the credit position that
enabled them, by the end of 1969, to purchase six Boeing 727's,
seventeen Boeing 737's, ninety-five DC-9's and twenty BAC 11 's.
These are hardly suitable aircraft to provide better service to the
smaller communities they served.
The Board's route strengthening policy had a substantial impact
on the routes of the local service carriers. For example, between
1954 and 1965 the proportion of local service carrier traffic
generated on competitive routes arose from nineteen to thirty-three
per cent even though the latter year was the year before the Board
began to promote direct trunkline-local service carrier competi-
tion."' In 1966 the Board did away with its long-standing general
" Seven States Area Investigation, 28 CAB 680 (1958).
" A route is defined as "competitive" if no single air carrier more than 90%
of the traffic on that route. United Research, Inc., Federal Regulation of the Do-
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policy of prohibiting nonstop flights by local service carriers in
markets also served by trunklines. If the Board allowed the locals
to serve the same routes as served by the trunklines, it was hoped
that they would earn sufficient profits to "internalize" the local
service subsidy. 8 Although thus far unsuccessful, this policy has
substantially increased the importance of competitive routes to the
local carriers."
The transfer of stations from trunklines to the locals had a par-
ticularly important impact on the strength of the routes of the
local service carrier. Although these stations made up only one-
third of the exclusively served stations in 1964, they provided
nearly one-half of the passenger originations at the exclusively
served cities. When these stations are included, average passengers
per station at the exclusively served cities grew 383 per cent over
the 1949-64 period." Average passengers per station however,
at the stations never served by trunklines grew by only 269 per
cent during the same period.
In order to concentrate energy and equipment on providing
service to the jointly served cities, the locals have reduced the
level of service they offer to smaller communities, most of which
are exclusively served stations. Moreover, this reduction in service
has been aided by the CAB policy of reducing required inter-
mediate stops and also by the Board's reduction since 1961 of the
number of daily flights it was prepared to subsidize."
The local carriers refuse to admit any decline in interest for
service to their smaller points. They have always stressed their
mestic Air Transport Industry (1959), CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, VI-5 COM-
PETITION AMONG DOMESTIC AIR CARRIERS, Tables B-19, 6 (1965).
"' The "route strengthening" policy prior to 1966 also had as its goal subsidy
internationalization, but the 1966 change in Board policy made this goal explicit.
"' Watkins estimates that the locals as a group lost approximately 20 million
dollars on their new competitive services in 1969, though results may improve
with time. He states that today about 70% of Allegheny's revenues come from
its competitive routes and that "they represent the fastest growing part of its sys-
tem." The twenty-eight city pairs, over which Mohawk competes with American
Airlines, produce 65% of Mohawk's revenues. Watkins, Locals Expand with
Mixed Results, AVIATION WEEK, July 6, 1970, at 25. See also Watkins, Locals
Trunk Vie for Short-Haul Traffic, AVIATION WEEK, July 13, 1970, at 33-37.
"' During the same period average passengers per station at the jointly served
stations grew 770%. See 1949 Air Traffic Survey, 1965 FLIGHT MAG., June 1965.
" CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON AIRLINES SUB-
siDY REDUCTION PROGRAM PURSUANT TO TRANSPORTATION MESSAGE OF 1962, at
4, 14-20 (1963).
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commitment to serve the smaller communities. As recently as
April 1969, for example, the local airlines declared:
In keeping with their primary mission of providing the best and
most efficient service to the smaller communities, the local air-
lines have constantly improved and expanded their service to those
communities. Analysis of the airports served reveals that the local
service carriers continue to give the smaller cities the highest
priority.5
Analysis of available data in Table 1 reveals a different story.
Local service, measured by the average number of departures per
station per day, has been stagnant in cities under 500,000, while
significantly increasing in the larger cities. Furthermore, this data
conceals much of the activity at those exclusively-served stations."
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF AIRPORTS SERVED BY LOCAL SERVICE AIR CARRIERS
AND FLIGHT DEPARTURES PER STATION PER DAY, BY POPULATION
OF CITIES SERVED, 1958 AND 1968.
Number of
Airports Total Annual Departures per
Served Departures Station per day
Population Grouping 1958 1968 1958 1968 1958 1968 Increase
0-100,000 224 233 312,000 428,000 3.8 5.0 1.2
100,000-500,000 118 150 326,000 525,000 7.6 9.6 2.0
500,000-1,000,000 28 33 79,000 192,000 7.7 15.9 8.2
over 1,000,000 31 44 144,000 456,000 12.7 28.4 15.7
All Airports 401 460 861,000 1,601,000 5.9 9.5 3.6
Source: Systems Analysis and Research Corporation, Public Benefits Provided
by the Local Airline Industry at 10 (1969).
Note: Data are mislabeled in original source.
Table 2, a tabulation of city population by passenger originations
for all 287 cities receiving service throughout 1969, shows that
only fifteen of these cities were above 100,000 in population."
" SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, PUBLIC BENEFITS PROVIDED
BY THE LOCAL AIRLINE INDUTRY 10 (1969).
"Some of these cities are served by uncertified air taxis, however.
"4The populations are "from the 1960 Census and latest available estimates."
In those cases in which an airport was listed as serving more than one city, the
combined populations of the designate cities was used. The largest city exclusively
served by the local carriers in 1969 was Anderson/New Castle/ Muncie, Indiana,
with a combined population of 159,869, See RAND MCNALLY ROAD ATLAS (1970).
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TABLE 2
NUMBER OF CITIES EXCLUSIVELY SERVED BY LOCAL SERVICE AIR
CARRIERS, BY NUMBER OF PASSENGER ORIGINATIONS AND BY CITY
POPULATION, 1969.
1969 Passenger Originations Per Station
7300- 12500- 25000- 50000- 100,000 Row
Population <7300 12499 24999 49999 99999 or > Total
<6,250 17 0 3 2 0 0 22
6,250-
12,499 35 9 4 0 2 0 50
12,500-
24,999 35 11 23 2 1 0 72
25,000-
49,999 32 15 20 15 4 0 86
50,000-
99,999 7 5 9 11 10 0 42
100,000 or
> 4 2 2 2 3 2 15
Column Total 130 42 61 32 20 2 287
Sources: 1970 Flight Mag. (June). Rand McNally Road Atlas, (1970).
Many smaller cities make intensive use of their air service. In
1969 thirty-three of the 144 exclusively served cities with a popu-
lation of less than 25,000 originated more passengers than their
listed population. Some of these points were resort areas and
military posts where the listed population underestimates the traffic
potential. Nevertheless, this achievement is impressive. In addition,
forty-nine per cent of the cities under 25,000 generated a traffic
level greater than one-half of their listed population.' This in-
" On the other hand, 42% of the fifty-seven cities having greater than a 50,000
population exclusively-served by local carriers generated a traffic level equivalent
to less than 25% of their population, and 79% of these cities generated traffic
equivalent to less than 10% of their population. This low level of traffic generated,
relative to population at these larger cities reflects the existence of superior
transportation alternatives. In most instances this superior alternative is an inter-
state highway. Of the eighteen cities of 50,000 or greater population generating
fewer than 12,500 passengers in 1969, all but two are within approximately an
hour's driving time of a large city having a superior air service. In other cases
an air taxi has entered the picture evidencing that the cities are not generating
their share of air traffic because of the poor service they are receiving from the
local carriers. Of the eighteen cities referred to above, ten were served by air
taxis or intrastate air carriers in 1969. This includes the two cases where cities
lay more than one hour's driving time from a large city.
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tensive use of air service at the smaller cities is not reflected in the
level of flight frequency provided them. Table 3 indicates that in
1969, thirty-four per cent of the exclusively-served stations of less
than 25,000 population received fewer than three departures per
day and eighty-three per cent of these cities received fewer than
six departures per day.
TABLE 3
NUMBER OF EXCLUSIVELY-SERVED CITIES BY LOCAL SERVICE AIR
CARRIERS BY NUMBER OF FLIGHT DEPARTURES PER DAY AND BY
CITY POPULATION, 1969.
Departures Per Station Per Day
Under 3.0- 6.0- 9.0- 12.0- 18.0-
City Population 3.0 5.99 8.99 11.99 17.99 23.99 24or more Total
<6,250 10 10 2 0 0 0 0 22
6,250-12,499 19 29 0 1 1 0 0 50
12,500-24,999 19 33 17 2 1 0 0 72
25,000-49,999 11 42 23 5 4 0 1 86
50,000-99,999 4 13 10 4 8 2 1 42
100,000 or > 1 4 3 2 3 1 1 15
Total 64 13-1 5-5 1-4 1-7 3 3 287
Sources: 1970 Flight Mag. (June). Rand McNally Road Atlas, (1970).
To determine if the smaller, exclusively-served cities receive
fewer departures than they are "entitled," the following simple
model was constructed to explain airline scheduling. An airline
was assumed to look at two factors in deciding how many flights to
offer a point-the amount of traffic it was expected to generate
and its population. The substitute for expected traffic, was the
actual number of passengers originated by the station during the
previous year. In addition the data for the 287 stations exclusively
served by local carriers in 1969 was used. The equation was esti-
mated in logarithmic form.
In (flight departures per station per year, 1969)
=2.742+0.45 In (passenger originations per year, 1969)
(24.32)




The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
All variables are significant at the one per cent level, as in the equa-
tion as a whole.
While the expected traffic substitute proves to have the strongest
effect, as expected, the population variable is also significant at
the one per cent level. The positive sign on this variable indicates
that of two cities generating equal amounts of traffic in 1969, the
more populous one offered more aircraft departures. A com-
parison of two towns in Colorado, Durango and Pueblo, is illus-
trative. In 1969, both cities originated approximately 14,000
passengers for Frontier, or about forty passengers per day. Durango
has a population of 10,530 and is located in a geographically
isolated section of southwestern Colorado. Driving time to Denver
from Durango is estimated at almost ten hours. 6 In other words,
air travel provides the only convenient way of getting to or from
Durango, and consequently, in 1969, Durango originated 1.4 air-
line passengers per capita.
. Pueblo is a city of 102,000 population lying forty miles south of
Colorado Springs and 110 miles south of Denver. Both Denver
and Colorado Springs possess trunkline air service. In addition
Interstate 25 connects Pueblo with both cities and the driving time
to Denver is estimated at 2 1/4 hours. In 1969, Pueblo originated
0.14 passengers per capita. During that year it received 2,370
departures or 6.4 per day, while Durango received 2,064 de-
partures, or 5.7 per day.
Other pairs of cities that roughly generated equal amounts of
traffic in 1969, but where the smaller city received fewer departures,
include Clovis, New Mexico (pop. 2,800) and Anderson/New
Castle/Muncie, Indiana (pop. 159,869); Crescent City, California
(pop. 2,958) and Trenton, New Jersey (pop. 102,000); and
Crossville, Tennessee (pop. 4,668), and Tacoma, Washington
(pop. 152,000). Admittedly, the population variable does not have
a great impact-the larger cities generally receive at most only a
few hundred departures per year more than the smaller cities, but
such behavior is not what would be expected from airlines who
"6 Denver is 285 air miles and 338 road miles from Durango. RAND McNALLY
RoAD ATLAS (1970).
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claim that "their primary mission [is] providing the best and most
efficient service to the smaller communities. 5"
It is also that "the local carriers continue to give the smaller
cities the highest priority."'" For example, of those 287 cities,
which received their only certificated air service from a local serv-
ice carrier, 197 were also served by the local carriers in 1959,
although earlier some were also served by trunklines. The remain-
ing ninety cities have been added to the routes of the local carriers
since 1959 either through the extension of air service to cities not
previously receiving it or through the suspension of trunklines and
their replacement by local carriers.
Table 4 shows a tabulation of change in average daily departures
by city size for the 197 points served during both 1959 and 1969.
Average daily departures declined at fifty-six per cent of these 197
stations. They declined in sixty-one per cent of the cities with
populations below 25,000 and in eighty-one per cent of the cities
with populations under 50,000." Furthermore, at many of the
stations in which departures were cut back, the scheduling of the
remaining departures was altered to reduce the attractiveness of
the service more than in proportion to the decline in departures.
The local carriers were able to provide flights at the most attractive
times to those stations in which the traffic response was likely to
be greatest.
V. THE COST TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PROVIDING
]LOCAL AIR SERVICE
The local service carriers cite subsidy per passenger carried as the
cost to the government of supporting local air service." The carriers
" See PUBLIC BENEFITS PROVIDED BY THE LOCAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY, supra
note 52, at 10.
"id.
"Average departures per station did slightly increase over the 1959-69 period
at these 197 stations. The average increase was fifty-four departures per year,
about 0.15 per day, This means that in 1969 this group of stations together re-
ceived about 10,500 more departures than they did in 1959. Between 1959 and
1969 total local service departures increased by 604,000 from 986,000 to
1,594,000. The bulk of this increase went to stations jointly served with trunk-
lines. At only five of the eighty-seven cities of less than 25,000 population did
departures rise by more than 3.0 per day. Departures increased by more than
three per day at only eleven of the 149 cities of under 50,000 population.
"The local carriers prefer to use the term "public service payments" rather
than "subsidy." See note 54 supra, at 14.
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TABLE 4
CITIES EXCLUSIVELY SERVED BY LOCAL SERVICE AIR CARRIERS
IN 1969 AND ALSO IN 1959, CLASSIFIED BY CHANGE IN AVERAGE
NUMBER OF DEPARTURES PER DAY AND BY CITY POPULATION.
Change in Average Number of Departures per Day 1959-69
Decrease Increase
greater -6.0 -3.0 0.01 +3.0 +6.0 +9.0
than to to to to to to +12.00- Row
Population -6.0 -3.01 0 +2.99 +5.99 +8.99 +11.99 more Total
<6,250 0 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 10
6,250-12,499 0 0 19 11 1 0 0 0 31
12,500-24,999 2 2 21 16 1 1 1 0 44
25,000-49,999 1 8 27 20 3 1 1 1 62
50,000-99,999 2 6 10 7 2 5 3 1 36
100,000 or greater 1 0 2 7 1 1 0 0 12
Column Total 6 16 88 62 8 8 5 2 195
Sources: 1970 Flight Mag. (June), 1960 Flight Mag. (June). Rand McNally
Road Atlas, (1970).
proudly point to the decrease in this figure from 10.27 dollars in
1954 to 1.54 dollars in 1969. However, this decline primarily
reflects traffic growth at the cities jointly served by trunklines and
local service carriers, cities that would not lose air service even if
local service subsidy were to be discontinued. A more revealing
cost would be measured by passengers at points which depend
solely upon local carriers for their certificated air service.
Table 5 represents an attempt to allocate the thirty-six million
dollars local service subsidy in 1969, an amount which several
carriers claimed was too low, to those stations that might have
been without service had it been discontinued and who, were the
true beneficiaries of the subsidy. The column labeled "total trips"
was constructed by assuming that all trips out of an exclusively-
served city were round trips and that no trips occurred between
exclusively-served cities. This assumption clearly is violated, and
to the extent it is, total trips are overestimated, leading to an
underestimate of the subsidy cost per trip."' As shown by the Table
"
1 fThis assumption becomes more valid at points generating less traffic. In
1949 less than 10% of the total trips for single carriers were between an in-
dividual carrier's exclusively served stations. An undetermined percentage of trips
also occurred between exclusively served points of different local service carriers.
An estimate of this bias as unavailable for more recent traffic.
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5, only 4.8 of the 23.4 million passengers carried by the local
carriers were generated at the 287 exclusively-served stations.
Based upon these assumptions, the subsidy per trip in 1968 was
3.79 dollars for each trip to or from an exclusively-served city. Of
course, not all exclusively-served cities require subsidization and
would be dropped if subsidy ceased. Cities generating over 25,000
passengers per year certainly would continue to be served. The
fifty-four exclusively-served cities in this class generated almost
sixty per cent of the passengers generated at all exclusively-served
stations. The rest of Table 5 reflects subsidy per trip on the as-
sumption that cities generating less than the amount of traffic
shown in each case would be dropped if subsidy were eliminated.
For example, if all cities generating more than 7,300 passengers
per year (twenty per day) would be retained in the absence of
subsidy, then the subsidy required per trip in 1969 to provide air
service for those which otherwise would be without air service was
39.98 dollars. If the cutoff point were 10,000 passengers per year,
subsidy per trip amounted to 26.07 dollars.
TABLE 5
LOCAL SERVICE AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC AT EXCLUSIVELY SERVED
CITIES GROUPED BY NUMBER OF ORIGINATING PASSENGERS AND
SUBSIDY PER TRIP, 1969.
Total Subsidy
Class of Station Number Originations Total Trips per tripb
Exclusively served stations 287 4.75 million 9.50 million $3.79
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 25,000
passengers per year 233 1.92 million 3.84 million $9.37
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 15,000
passengers per year 189 1.07 million 2.14 million $16.81
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 10,000
passengers per year 158 0.69 million 1.38 million $26.07
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 7,300
passengers per year 130 0.44 million 0.88 million $40.89
Source: 1970 Flight Mag. (June).
Total subsidy paid in 1969 was $35,981,100.
Table 6, using the same set of assumptions, shows similar infor-
mation for 1954, fifteen years earlier. Both fares and costs have
increased since 1954, however, so the definition of a "marginal"
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station may have changed. It was determined in 1959, that the
minimum avoidable cost of serving an on-line intermediate station
with a frequency of two round trips per day was 65,000 dollars if
a DC-3 was used and 115,000 dollars if a Convair 340/440 was
used.' Assuming that all service to marginal airports was provided
TABLE 6
LOCAL SERVICE AIR CARRIER AT EXCLUSIVELY SERVED CITIES
GROUPED BY NUMBER OF ORIGINATING PASSENGERS AND SUBSIDY
PER TRIP, 1954.
Total Subsidy*
Class of Station Number Originations Total Trips per trip
Total 216 0.63 million 1.27 million $18.70
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 25,000
passengers per year 215 0.61 million 1.22 million $19.50
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 15,000
passengers per year 212 0.54 million 1.09 million $21.80
Exclusively served stations
originating fewer than 10,000
passengers per year 204 0.45 million 0.89 million $26.70
Exclusively served stations
generating fewer than 7,300
passengers per year 197 0.39 million 0.77 million $30.96
Exclusively served stations
generating fewer than 5,000
passengers per year 181 0.29 million 0.58 million $41.00
* Subsidy earned in 1954 (after adjustments) amounted to $23,807,000.
Sources: 1955 Flight Mag. (June). Ciivl Aeronautics Board, Handbook of
Airline Statistics, 1965.
using DC-3's and further assuming that the average passenger at
such an airport paid the average local service fare of 13.25 dollars,
then the station would need to generate at least 5,000 passengers
per year to contribute to the profit of a local carrier."
Recent figures indicate that a station would need to generate
between 7,700 passengers per year to cover the minimum avoidable
costs of providing it with two round trips per day using an F-27.
62UNITED RESEARCH, INC., FEDERAL REGULATION ON THE DOMESTIC AIR
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 56-59, tables B-25 through B-28 (1959).
" The same study estimated that if subsidy had been ended in 1958, approxi-
mately half of the 530 stations then receiving scheduled air service would have
lost that service. During 1958 the 265th ranking city, in terms of passenger origi-
nations, was Columbus, Mississippi with 6915 originations. Id. at 111.
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If a Convair 580 was used, the station would have been required
to generate approximately 9,000 passengers. If these figures are
accepted and Table 5 is compared with Table 6, the resulting con-
clusion is that the cost to the government of providing air service
to those points that otherwise would be without air service has not
declined, and perhaps even increased, over the last fourteen years."
One reason why subsidy costs were so high in 1968 was the
stagnation of traffic at many of the exclusively-served points by
local service carriers. Between 1959 and 1969, while total local
service passenger originations were rising from 5.2 million to 24.5
million, originations declined and stayed constant at seventeen per
cent at the 197 cities exclusively served by the local service
carrier in both 1969 and 1959. But unquestionably, the major
reason for the high subsidy requirements was the failure of the
local service carriers to use properly suited aircraft to provide
service at their marginal stations.
Table 7 shows an estimate of the total operating costs (including
an allowance to cover rate of return on investment) for three air-
craft-the Convair 580, the Nord 262 and the DHC Twin Otter.
The Convair is typical of the aircraft the local carriers are using
to serve their low density routes now that the DC-3 has been
eliminated from their fleets. The Nord is the modern turboprop
DC-3 replacement used periodically by Lake Central and by its
successor, Allegheny. The Twin Otter is an aircraft widely used
by the air taxis. The cost levels shown for the Twin Otter are in-
cluded to indicate the minimum possible costs local service carriers
could achieve by operating a no-frills, efficient, short-haul air
service.
Table 7 shows that subsidy need was increased by sixty cents per
mile for every mile operated using a Convair 580 where an aircraft
' A recent study commissioned by the local service airlines themselves em-
ployed a somewhat different method of distributing subsidy. Any point failing to
generate revenues sufficient to cover the costs allocated to that station was as-
signed a share of the subsidy. Thus $245,000 of Ozark Air Lines' calendar year
1968 subsidy of $3.5 million was assigned to Miline/Davenport/Rock Island, a
station originating over 70,000 passengers for Ozark during that year and served
also by United. Over $230,000 of the subsidy was attributed to Peoria, Illinois,
a city served exclusively by Ozark that originated 125,000 passengers in 1969 and
received nineteen departures per day. A total of $1.9 million of Ozark's 1968
subsidy was attributed to eleven cities each of which originated more than 25,000
passengers in 1968. See note 54 supra, at 12, 13, 64.
LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES
the size of a Nord could have handled the traffic and by 1.26
dollars per mile over what would have been required to provide an
efficiently-run, short-haul air service using Twin Otters.
TABLE 7
OPERATING COSTS AT 90-MILE AVERAGE STAGE LENGTH, FOR
CONVAIR 580, NORD 262, AND DE HAVILLAND TWIN OTTER.
De Havilland
Convair 580* Nord 262 Twin Offer
Maximum seating capacity 53 28 20
Direct operating costs $1.27 $0.99 $0.60
($ per mile)
Indirect operating costs 0.95 0.74 0.45
Return on Investment 0.33 0.22 0.24
$2.55 $1.95 $1.25
* The Convair 580 direct operating costs are those actually experienced by
operators of this aircraft in 1958 according to the CAB "Aircraft Operating Cost
and Performance Report," August 1969, issue. These costs were adjusted for a
90 mile average stage length using information contained in Senate Aviation Sub-
committee, Review of the Local Air Carrier Industry (89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Feb. 28, March 1, 3, and 4, 1966), pp. 136 and 159. Indirect costs were assumed
to be 75% of direct costs following SARC, "Economic Analysis of the Short
Haul Transport." Total investment required per aircraft for the Convair and
Nord were taken from Civil Aeronautics Board, "Local Service Carriers' Unit
Costs, year ended March 31, 1969," Attachment C, part 3, p. 1. Total equipped
cost of the Twin Otter was assumed to be the price being quoted by the manu-
facturer in mid-1968 for the Twin Otter, Series 300. This figure was multiplied
by 1.5 in order to arrive at average investment per aircraft. This procedure was
in keeping with the one followed in the CAB document just referred to. It was
assumed that a 10% rate of return on investment would be allowed. Rate of re-
turn per mile was computed by dividing this annual return figure by the number
of miles each aircraft was assumed to fly in a year. For the Convair this was
500,000 miles, for the Nord 400,000 miles, and for the Twin Otter, 270,000
miles. These figures were all within the range of actual figures achieved by op-
erators of these aircraft taking the 90 mile average stage length into account.
To estimate the total increase in 1969 subsidy requirements
attributable to the use of larger aircraft, the number of aircraft
miles that could have been flown using smaller aircraft has to be
estimated. The optimal size of smaller aircraft for the local carriers
has been determined to be of a twenty seat capacity and also that
in 1975 these aircraft should be flown seventy-one million miles by
the local carriers.
1972]
30 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [38
The SARC reporte assumed that all low-density routes flown
during 1963 would continue to be flown during 1975. Since 1963,
however, some of these routes have been abandoned. Therefore,
a conservative assumption is that in 1969 the local service carriers
should have flown only forty-four million aircraft miles using equip-
ment of the size of the Nord 262 or Twin Otter, the same number
of aircraft miles that they actually flew with DC-3's during 1963.
In 1969 the local service carriers actually flew about three million
aircraft miles using such equipment-primarily the Nord 262. The
difference leaves forty-one million aircraft miles that were flown in
1969 using aircraft that were too large. This implies that the
subsidy need (including the rate of return element) was increased
from twenty-five million dollars (assuming Nords would have been
used rather than Convair 580s) to fifty-two million dollars (as-
suming Twin Otters could have been used and air taxi cost levels
achieved). In contrast, the actual subsidy paid in 1969 was thirty-
six million dollars.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS
Several alternatives are available in deciding the future of gov-
ernment policy towards local air service. First, the local service
subsidy could be phased out over a short period; i.e., one to five
years, and the local service carriers could be allowed to abondon
any routes they wished. They would then be treated as trunklines
for regulatory purposes. The extent of abandonment would depend
upon the level of unsubsidized service the local carriers chose to
offer. If cities generating more than 7,300 passengers per year can
cover the marginal cost of their service, then only 130 cities who
depend solely upon local service carriers for their certificated air
service (based upon 1969 data) would be dropped. If 15,000
passengers per year were required, then 158 cities would lose serv-
ice. If stations not generating at least 25,000 passengers per year
were dropped, 233 cities would lose service. This figure of 25,000
passengers per year (or about seventy per day), appears to be the
level of required traffic to support the type of small jet service
recently acquired in large numbers by the local carriers. Then, all
See SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH CORPORATION, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE SHORT HAUL TRANPORT (1964).
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but seven of the 144 exclusively-served cities of under 25,000
population would lose their certificated air service. Partially off-
setting this loss would be the entry of air taxis that can although
unsubsidized, profitably serve cities of lower traffic generating
potential than can the local carriers because of air taxis' lower
costs. However, the extent to which such replacement would occur
is open to speculation.
A second possibility is to provide government subsidy to the
extent necessary to allow the local carriers to continue to offer
service of the type they presently offer using whatever aircraft they
choose to employ. While the substantial losses recently incurred by
the airline industry are to some extent the result of non-recurring
costs associated with both newly acquired aircraft and competitive
routes recently awarded to the local carriers in the Board's mis-
taken attempt to internalize the local service subsidy, there is no
doubt that adoption of this option would require a substantial and
immediate increase of the local service subsidy. Furthermore, it is
almost certain that the local service subsidy would rise in the
future, since even now some of the local carriers are beginning to
talk about phasing out their turboprops and converting to all jet
equipment."
Third, the government could encourage local carriers to sub-
contract with air taxis to assume services at smaller stations. This
approach was pioneered by Allegheny, which in October 1967
turned over its services at Hagerstown, Maryland, to Henson Avia-
tion. Under the terms of Allegheny's contract with the air taxi
operator, Henson is guaranteed a break even financial result during
the first two years of the contract based upon a standard cost allo-
cation. Allegheny provides reservation and customer service at the
terminal point and requires Henson to meet Allegheny's standards
of customer service. The contract runs for ten years, and Allegheny
guarantees to resume flights with at least the same level of service
in effect prior to the contract if the agreement is terminated.
Allegheny considers its experiment to have been a success. The
improved frequency of service offered by Henson has stimulated
traffic and the carrier claims to be at least breaking even on its
"See Editorial, Frontier's Reversing the Adverse, FLIGIrr MAG., June 1970,
at 45. Operating costs per mile (including rate of element) for the DC-9-10 are
approximately thirty-nine per cent higher than for a Convair 580.
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Hagerstown services. The alleged savings to the government in
subsidy reduction at Hagerstown is 84,921 dollars per year. As of
April 1970, Allegheny had transferred thirteen of its stations to
air taxi operators under such agreements, and the carrier is known
to be negotiating additional agreements. Ten stations had been
transferred by Frontier, and eight points by other local carriers."'
Such a plan of local carrier transfer to air taxis was endorsed in a
recent speech by a Board member," though he was careful to state
that his remarks did not imply Board endorsement of such a gen-
eral transfer policy. The Board member estimated that approxi-
mately 120 points generating fewer than fifteen passengers per day
in 1969 were "suitable" for such a transfer. He proposed that local
carriers receive a fee for "administration" of the contracts.
An alternative plan of obtaining the efficiencies afforded by the
use of small turboprop feeder aircraft would be for the government
to directly contract with air taxis to provide those feeder services
where in the public interest." Local service carriers could list cities
they proposed to drop and where continuation of service appeared
desirable (either economically or politically). The government
could announce that it was accepting bids for the annual lump sum
subsidy required to operate a specified frequency of service from
designated points to the particular city. The low bidder would be
awarded a long term contract to provide this service. While the
large number of air taxi operators should assure that the scheme
would not yield the winner exorbitant profits, the opposite result
conceivably presents a problem. Air taxi operators, over optimistic
about traffic and costs, might be tempted to bid too low. In some
cases bidders, taking their cue from the early air mail contract
bids, or from the experience of defense contractors, might purposely
bid low to "buy into" the program, expecting the government to be
willing to "recontract" later. In these events the government would
have to be prepared to allow an over optimistic bidder to go broke.
The supply of potential entrants is large enough to insure that
", Since 1964, trunklines have turned over twenty-three points to air taxis. See
AVIATION WEEK, June 1970, at 35.
"Address by John G. Adams, Association of Local Transport Airlines Re-
gional Meeting, May 1, 1970.
" This proposal is similar to that advanced by Swaine, A Proposal for Control
of Local Service Subsidies, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 181 (1965).
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another operator would be prepared to take his place at a slightly
higher level of subsidy.
Economically, this plan has many advantages. Foremost is its
maximum incentive for efficiency. Any cost savings the air taxi
operator could obtain would be translated directly into increased
profits. A second advantage is that the government could be un-
concerned about the type of aircraft used by the contractor, as
long as he met the terms of the contract concerning frequency and
reliability of service. If it wanted, the operator could freely use a
Boeing 747 on a fifty mile flight between a small community and
a larger city. The gain or loss incurred would accrue entirely to
him. Moreover, bidding for these contracts should not be limited
to air taxi operators. If a trunk or local service carrier felt that it
could serve the point by regular flights at lower cost than an air taxi
using smaller equipment, then a bid should be allowed.
The third advantage of this scheme is that it prevents the con-
tinuation of the illusion, possible under the subcontracting scheme,
that the local carriers are still serving the smaller cities for which
they were created. Furthermore, since no "administration fee" is
paid to the locals, a disguised subsidy would be impossible. This is
not to say that the air taxi contractors under the direct contracting
scheme would not use trunkline and local carrier reservation serv-
ices and ground facilities, but merely that arrangements for the use
of such facilities could be directly made between these carriers and
the air taxi contractors with the price charged covering the cost of
providing the facilities plus a reasonable profit.
The final advantage of this scheme is that it would eliminate one
reason for economic regulation of the airline industry. The major
cause of regulation today is the need to control entry to preserve
profits on denser routes for use in subsidizing thinner routes.
Under the scheme being proposed, this need would cease since
losses would be directly borne by the government. The costs of
providing air service to smaller communities would be apparent to
all. This is a feature of all four options.
Necessarily, the direct contracting proposal crucially depends
upon the government's willingness to require the contractors to
adhere to the terms of the contract. As recent experience with the
defense contractors as well as earlier experience with air mail con-
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tracts demonstrates, the possibility of "recontracting" after a con-
tract has been awarded encourages bidders to "buy into" programs
with unrealistically low bids."0 The relationship of the CAB vis-a-
vis the local carriers over the last twenty-five years provides little
ground for hope that the CAB could be expected to exercise the
necessary firmness with winning bidders. The Board's major con-
cern has been with the financial health of the carriers and not the
cost and quality of the service provided to the communities. For
this reason, the direct bidding scheme might prove to be unwork-
able in practice in spite of its apparent advantages. Therefore, the
plan of having local carriers subcontract with air taxis would rep-
resent a "second-best" type of solution.
This scheme transfers to the contracting local carrier the respon-
sibility for enforcing cost consciousness upon the air taxi subcon-
tractor. Yet some degree of firmness by government is necessary
if savings in subsidy are to persist. The air taxis operate low cost
services today because they must cut costs to have any chance of
surviving. But once assured of survival through subcontracts with
local carriers, they may be expected to become less cost conscious.
In this they are certain to have the support of the Air Line Pilots'
Association which already has managed to thwart at least one
attempt by a local service carrier to use small aircraft." Only by
adopting a method of regulation and subsidization that takes ad-
vantage of the virtually limitless number of people who want to
own their own airline can the type of efficiencies envisioned by the
Board in 1944 be retained. The history of regulation of the local
service carriers over the last twenty-five years provides ample evi-
dence of how easy it is to fail to accomplish this objective.
70 See R.E. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 124 (1962); Editorial,
LOH Hearing May Spur Tighter Bidding Rules, AVIATION WEEK, March 12,
1967, at 87.
71 Cf. Pickering, Five Regionals Using Small Twins, FLIGHT MAG., March
1970, at 42. See Editorial, Where Others Get in Pilot's Seat, Bus. WEEK, March
1, 1969, at 92.
